Corruption Risks

Less than half of Albanian citizens (44%) claim to have had experience with bribery in 2015. Bribery is more prevalent in rural areas than in urban areas and bribes are given in the form of cash and in-kind contributions. Mostly, bribes are paid to facilitate bureaucratic procedures, or to avoid deficiencies and bottlenecks in the public sector. The most common reasons for paying bribes cited by businesses are: to “speed up business-related procedures” (39.1 per cent of all bribes), “making the finalisation of a procedure possible” (16.8 per cent), “receiving better treatment” (7.2 per cent), “reducing the cost of a procedure” (6.6 per cent) and “receiving information” (2.8 per cent). At the same time, almost one out of seven (13.5 per cent) bribes paid serve no specific immediate purpose for the businesses paying them, suggesting that these are “sweeteners” given to public officials to “groom” them for future interactions in the interest of the company.

The Government has launched several online portals to report bribery and other forms of corruption.

The results of the above-mentioned public opinion survey on corruption show that since April-May 2018, perceptions of both the amount of bribes and the frequency of bribery cases have changed. Thus, 82.4% of respondents believe that the amount of bribes has decreased significantly or to some extent. About 91% of respondents thought that the frequency of bribery has decreased. A comparison with the results of a 2010 survey on corruption shows that the share of those who avoid bribery has increased from 23% in 2010 to 37.6% in 2019.

The practice of investigating and pursuing bribery-related cases seem to be improved significantly during the latest years.

Receiving/requesting. The official statistics on the results of the investigation of corruption crimes, published annually by the General Prosecution Service of the Republic of Armenia, shows that in 2017, 104 instances of receiving/requesting a bribe were investigated by law-enforcement agencies, with charges brought against individuals in 73 cases. Investigated cases of receiving/requesting a bribe increased in 2018, with a total of 193 cases, whereas 87 were pursued. In 2019, 256 cases of receiving/requesting a bribe were investigated, out of which charges were brought against 136 individuals. In 2020, 224 cases were investigated, whereas only 132 individuals were charged.

Offering/giving. As for offering/giving a bribe, in 2017 41 cases were investigated and charges brought against 103 individuals, compared with 65 cases investigated and 137 persons charged in 2018. In 2019, 42 cases of receiving/requesting a bribe were investigated, out of which 22 were pursued. In 2020, 39 cases were investigated, out of which only 13 were pursued. As it is clear, bribery cases have decreased in recent years while the rate of its prosecution has increased.

Mediating. With regards to mediation in bribery, in 2017 and 2018 seven criminal cases have been investigated, 17 persons were prosecuted. In 2019-2020 only seven cases have been investigated, and 46 persons were prosecuted.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, corruption is widespread and systematically disrupts any reform processes aimed at establishing the functioning rule of law. A high degree of corruption causes enormous moral and material damage to society. “Citizens and businesses face an inflexible legal system and significant corruption… About 10 per cent of companies say they had to bribe public officials in the previous year, between one- and two-thirds of citizens believe relations are necessary to get a job, to be enrolled in school or to obtain official documents.” A major problem is that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there are de facto four autonomous criminal justice systems, which result primarily in internal non-compliance with regulations and then non-compliance with international standards. While the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina is relatively well harmonised with international standards, the entity criminal laws, as well as the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, are lagging in the harmonisation process, and not even the GRECO's binding recommendations have been implemented.The fact that bribery in the private sector is not explicitly criminalised in criminal law is also very important, which is also one of GRECO's binding recommendations.

In addition to the institutional and legal framework, which have significant weaknesses, a major problem is non-enforcement of laws and a lenient penal policy, which has an insufficient impact on the prevention of corruption.

Bribery remains one of the most frequent forms of corruption in Kosovo*. According to Transparency International, the bribery rate in Kosovo* is at 10%. Bribery remains widespread in almost all areas of the public sector, thus undermining the proper functioning of public institutions and affecting the vital interests of citizens of Kosovo*. Citizens are continuously exposed to situations where they have to pay a bribe to get a good quality service. Usually bribes are paid in cash, but other forms of bribery are frequently used as well, such as gifts. In addition to its spread in the public sector, bribery is also found in the private sector, especially in the business sector. Most businesses that are in direct or indirect contact with a public official have been asked or have offered to pay a bribe in order to get a service. The rate of bribery among those businesses which had contacts with public officials is 3.2%.

An impact assessment report of the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2020 indicates that the estimated volume of bribe accounted for in 2019 was 516 million Moldovan Lei (MDL): MDL 319.4 million from the general population and MDL 197.3 million from economic units. In 2017 the same indicator accounted for MDL 405 million.

The same study shows that the general incidence of informal payments is relatively low. According to the survey data, 7% of the respondents from the general population and 4.7% of the business units have recognized that they have offered informal payments during 2019. The average number of times a person from the general population offered a bribe is 5.4 times per year (as compared to 3.7 in 2017); in case of a business unit it is 3.5 times (as compared to 6.1 in 2017).

Data shows that the maximum amount of the offered bribe has also decreased, as compared to previous years: the value of informal payments varied between MDL 50 and MDL 20,000 both in the case of business units and the general population. In 2017 these amounts varied between MDL 100 and MDL 500,000 in the case of business units, and between MDL 50 and MDL 8,000 in the case of the general population.

Overall, the general population, as per the above assessment, have become less tolerant towards corruption, and now consider any corruption situation to be unacceptable, by stating that they would not agree to give bribes, regardless of the situation and personal benefit.

When it comes to attitude change among the general population vis-à-vis reporting an act of bribery, there is a positive change: about 87% of the survey respondents stated that in encountering such situations they would most probably/certainly report the corruption acts to the anti-corruption agencies through different means.

International and national surveys on the perception and experience of corruption in Ukraine indicate that bribery is widespread in the country. In 2017, 25.5% of Ukrainians claimed to have paid a bribe over the past year. Those who paid a bribe mainly did it to access public health services (46.3%), higher education institutions (22.5%) and local public authorities (13.6%). At the same time, 29% of Ukrainians replied that they refuse to pay bribes.

In 2020, 32% had an experience of bribery in medical institutions, 19% – in educational institutions, 11% – in the police.

Establishing the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine led to an economic effect in the form of compensation for damages caused by crimes, return of illegal income, penalties in favour of the state, and prevention of theft which only in 2020 amounted to UAH 1.93 billion (approx. 63 million EUR), of which UAH 1.14 billion was returned to the state, and UAH 805.6 million was prevented from being stolen.

Based on Article 244 of the Criminal Code, the active corruption of persons exercising public function is defined as «promising, direct or indirect proposal, offer, or giving, to a person, who exercises public functions, of any irregular benefit for himself or a third person in order to act or not act in relation to his duty, is punished by imprisonment from six months up to three years».

As per Article 245 of the Criminal Code, the commission of this same offence by high state officials and local elected representatives is considered an aggravating circumstance and, thus, the penalty in this case is imprisonment from one to five years.

As regards passive corruption committed by persons that exercise public functions, it is defined in Article 259 as follows: «Soliciting or taking, directly or indirectly, any kind of irregular benefit or of any such promise up to the value of 50 000 Albanian lek (ALL) or the equivalent in foreign currency, for himself or for a third person, or accepting an offer or promise deriving from an irregular benefit, by a person who exercises public functions, in order to act or not act in the exercise of his duty, is punishable by imprisonment of from two up to three years. The same act, when the irregular benefit or the promise of such a benefit is over the value of ALL 50 000 or the equivalence in foreign currency, is punishable by imprisonment of from three up to eight years ». As with active corruption, and as stipulated in Article 260, the penalty for passive corruption by high state officials or local elected officials increases from four up to twelve years.

The Criminal Code of Armenia sets a number of penalties for the bribery.

Article 311 of the Criminal Code establishes liability for passive bribery, which is – receiving or demanding or accepting a promise or offer to receive money, property, property rights, securities or any other advantage by an official in person or through an intermediary, for the purpose of performing or not performing any act within the scope of his / her authority for the benefit of the bribe-giver or the person represented by him / her. This crime should be punished with a fine amounting 300-500 times the minimum salary, or imprisonment of up to 12 years, and are also barred from holding certain positions or engaging in certain activities for a maximum term of 3 years, with or without confiscation of property (depending on aggravating circumstances).

Active bribery is criminalised in Article 312 of the Criminal Code, which states that a person is punishable for promising, offering or providing money, property, property rights, securities or any other advantage to an official in person or through an intermediary, for the purpose of performing or not performing any act within the scope of his / her authority for the benefit of the bribe-giver or the person represented by him / her. The same article states that providing a bribe to an official is punishable by a fine amounting 100-400 times the minimum salary, or with the arrest for a term of 1-3 months, or imprisonment for a term of up to 7 years. The law also states that the bribe-giver is exempted from criminal liability if the extortion of bribe took place and the bribe-giver no later than within three days after the committed crime voluntarily informed the criminal prosecution authorities about the bribery and supported the disclosure of the crime.

Article 313 of the Criminal Code also establishes liability for the mediation in bribery, which is to facilitate a bribe-giver or bribe-taker in reaching an agreement on a bribe or on implementing an agreement that has already been reached. Intermediary in bribery should be punished with a fine amounting 100-400 times the minimum salary, or with the arrest for a term of 1-3 months, or imprisonment for a term of up to 5 years.

Criminal laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina criminalize two offences separately, which fall under the notion of bribery. The criminal offence of accepting gifts and other forms of benefits (Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina) ¹, or the criminal offence of accepting bribes (Criminal Code of Republika Srpska) ² implies the act of extortion of some benefit, amounting to an act of corruption that is committed in connection with the performance or non-performance of a certain official act.

This criminal offence manifests itself in three forms:

1. real passive bribery in which the act of execution is reflected in requesting or receiving gifts or other benefits or receiving promises of gifts or other benefits, with the aim of committing an act within the public official’s powers, which action an official or responsible person should not otherwise perform, or omission of an action that she/he would otherwise have to perform;
2. false passive bribery – a situation when an official or responsible person requests or receives a bribe or promise of a bribe, in order to act within the limits of her/his official authority and take legal actions that fall within her/his regular business, or not to take actions for which she/he is not authorised by the law;
3. subsequent passive bribery – demanding or receiving a bribe after a committed or unperformed (legal or illegal) official action.

Penalties for this criminal offence are prescribed in different ranges in the criminal laws in BiH.

Another form of corruption, functionally related to the aforementioned criminal offence, is the criminal offence of giving gifts and other benefits, regulated through all four criminal laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This act implies inducing an official or another responsible person to violate the lawful performance of his/her service. This, as well as the aforementioned criminal offence, manifests itself in three forms as:

1. areal active bribery - which means making or promising a gift or some other benefit to an official or responsible person for him/her to perform an action within his/her authority which he/she should otherwise not perform, or for him/her not to perform the action that he/she is otherwise obliged to perform;
2. false active bribery, which means making or promising a gift or some other benefit to an official or responsible person in order for him/her to perform, within his/her powers, an act that he/she is obliged to perform, or not to perform an act that he/she should not otherwise perform;
3. mediation of bribery, which is an independent criminal offence that can be committed through various actions (by acquainting with each other the bribe-giver and recipient, for instance).

Penalties for the criminal offence of giving gifts and other forms of benefits or giving bribes and the previous criminal offence are prescribed in different ranges in the criminal laws in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In all criminal laws, except Republika Srpska, an alternative to a fine in addition to imprisonment is envisaged for a certain form of this criminal offence.

In Kosovo*, bribery as a form of corruption is regulated and sanctioned with the Criminal Code of Kosovo*. It recognises corruption in the private sector and the public sector. Differences between bribery in these two sectors lie in the person to whom the bribe is offered or accepted from, and in the punishment that is imposed. In both cases, the Criminal Code penalises both active and passive bribery.

In the public sector active bribery happens when someone “promises, offers or gives, directly or indirectly, any undue gift or advantage to an official person, for himself or herself or for another person, so that the official person acts or refrains from acting in accordance with his or her official duties or in violation of his or her official duties”. Whereas passive bribery happens when an “official person requests or receives, directly or indirectly, any undue gift or advantage, for himself, herself or for another person, or accepts an offer or promise of such gift or advantage, so that the official person acts or refrains from acting in accordance with his or her official duties or in violation of his or her official duties”.  

According to the Criminal Code, active bribery in the private sector is punished by a fine and imprisonment of 6 months to 8 years and passive bribery is punished by a fine and imprisonment of 1 to 15 years (Article 421 and 422). In the private sector, both active and passive bribery is punished also by a fine, imprisonment of 6 months to 5 years and the gift or advantage gained will be confiscated (Article 309 and 310).

Article 43 of the Integrity Law no. 82 establishes disciplinary, civil, administrative or criminal liability for corruption offences. The next articles no. 44, 45 and 46 list all corruption acts, corruption connected acts, and corruptible deeds. Public agents, including foreign ones, private individuals, and corporate entities shall bear liability, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Code, for the commission of corruption acts. The legislation of the Republic of Moldova currently prohibits, among others, active corruption, bribe giving, corruption of voters, passive corruption, bribe taking, receiving illicit remuneration for carrying out works related to population servicing; traffic of influence, event manipulation, arranged bets, illegal financing of political parties or electoral campaigns, violation of financial means’ administration within political parties or electoral funds, conflict of interest, abetting personal assets and interests, illicit enrichment, embezzlement of public patrimony, embezzlement of means from foreign funds, use of means from internal loans or foreign funds contrary to their destination.

Currently, regulations on gifts in public administration are stipulated in the following normative acts: Law No. 25 on the Code of Conduct of the Civil Servant of 22 February 2008; Law on Integrity No. 82 of 25 May 2017, and the Government Decision on the legal regime of gifts No. 116 of 26 February 2020.

Additionally, Law No. 325 (2013) on Institutional Integrity Assessment sets forth the regulatory purpose, principles, means, methods, procedures, and legal effects of institutional integrity in the context of public entities. Article 2. of this law stipulates that “The assessment of institutional integrity is carried out for the purpose of: (a) enhancing the accountability of the leaders of public entities and organisations in order to develop, maintain, and strengthen the climate of professional integrity within the public entities; (b) ensuring professional integrity of public agents, preventing and combating corruption within the public entities; (c) the identification, assessment, and elimination of corruption risks within public entities; (d) increasing the number of tip-offs relating to manifestations of corruption admitted by public agencies.”

Article 16 of the Law on Integrity No. 82 of 25 May 2017 sets forth the legal regime of gifts. It stipulates that the leaders of public entities, as well as public agents, are prohibited from soliciting or accepting gifts (goods, services, favours, invitations, or any other advantages). Such requests or acceptance of inadmissible gifts constitute acts of corruption within the meaning of criminal legislation and of the provisions of Chapter VI of the current law.

Additionally, the Government Decision No. 116/2020 on the Legal Regime of Gifts stipulates that the total allowed value of the gifts offered out of politeness or on the occasion of certain protocol actions amounts to a maximum value of MDL 1,000 for one year. The current decision stipulates that a commission for recording and assessing gifts must be established within all public entities, in which public agents operate in the framework of Article 3 of the Law of Integrity No. 82/2017. The Government Decision No.134 of 22 February 2013 is repealed by the Government Decision No. 116/2020.

The National Anti-Corruption Centre has launched the “reLAWed” online platform with the aim to provide people with the possibility to get involved in the process of improving the legal framework, take action, identify and notify/communicate about deficient or interpretable normative acts, which have generated or may generate acts of corruption, abuse, or other illegalities.

The Ukrainian legislation uses the notion of “unjustified benefits” (nepravomirna vyhoda) instead of the term “bribery”. The Law No. 1700-VII “On Prevention of Corruption” of 14 October 2014 provides the following definition: “Unjustified benefit means money or other property, preferences, advantages, services, non-monetary assets, and any other benefits that are being illicitly promised, offered, delivered, or received by the person, who is authorized to perform public or local self-government functions”. This definition expands bribery to the non-monetary forms of received benefit.

In line with Article 368 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, receiving or providing unjustified benefits can be punished by a fine, community work, deprivation of the right to hold certain office positions or engage in certain activities, or imprisonment, depending on the degree of the crime.

Study findings suggest that the management and prevention of conflict of interest in Albania has been deficient due to the frequent amendments of the regulatory framework and lack of law enforcement. The reported cases of conflict of interest focus almost exclusively on the conflicts of interest of financial or economic nature. Local governments, as a result of the decentralisation process and their increased interactions with the public, have been increasingly exposed to the risk of conflict of interest. The cases of conflict of interest are mostly related to building permits, procurement, and use of public spaces. One of the efforts to address this issue is also the approval of the Inter-Sectoral Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020.  In 2014, legislative amendments in laws related to the declaration of assets and the conflict of interest were approved, increasing the number and frequency of audits from the High Inspectorate of Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest (HIDAACI).

Conflict of interest in Armenia is a major phenomenon given the small size of the society and family connections as well as poor awareness and recognition of the issue, inadequate regulations and practices of management.

Conflict of interest is regulated for the public sector - for public officials and public servants. Though the issue was somehow regulated by of the Law on Public Service and was under the supervision of the Commission on Ethics of High-Ranking Officials since 2011, still in 2014, a survey amongst the public officials showed that there was a lack of understanding of the issue. Only 56 % of respondents understood the definition of conflict of interest, and 61 % thought that a civil servant has a right to make a decision in a situation of conflict of interest.

According to the Law on Corruption Prevention Commission passed in 2017, in November 2019,  the Commission on Ethics of High-Ranking Officials was replaced with the Corruption Prevention Commission (hereinafter – also CPC), which possessed a broader scope of jurisdiction and more enhanced mechanisms in respect with regulation of conflict of interest matters, including the oversight of compliance of public officials with incompatibility requirements and limitations, assurance of unified practices, revealing conflict of interest through examination of declarations of assets and income, education and awareness raising, etc.

CPC: The main function of CPC in regards to the conflict of interests is the detection of conflict of interests and violations of ethics rules by persons holding public office (except for the Members of Parliament, Judges and members of the Supreme Judicial Council, prosecutors, investigators), heads of communities, their deputies, heads of administrative districts of Yerevan community, their deputies. CPC does not deal with situational cases of the conflict of interest. Instead, those are dealt by supervisors of respective institutions.

The major mechanism for CPC’s control of conflict of interest is the collection, verification and analysis of declarations and data related to assets, income, expenditures and interests of public officials. Declarations submitted by the relevant officials and public servants electronically are published on the website of CPC at www.cpcarmenia.am with an exception of personal data. The current system of declarations is being modernised to ensure interoperability with several state databases (police, real estate, companies, tax) to ensure more effectiveness.

Ethics commissions of public servants - follow up applications on the incompatibility requirements and other restrictions, violations of the code of conduct and situational conflict of interest cases and develop proposals to the respective institutions or officials to prevent or to eliminate conflict of interest situation in question.

Integrity officers within institutions – consult the public servants of their institutions on the incompatibility requirements and other restrictions, code of conduct, suggest measures to resolve conflict of interest related issues; manage the statistics on incompatibility requirements and other restrictions, violations of the code of conduct and conflict of interest cases.  

In present, the integrity officers’ institute is not functioning yet because of the lack of relevant by-laws and regulations.

Conflict of interest is a widespread corruption risk in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to regulations, conflict of interest implies cases when elected officials, executive office-holders and advisers find themselves in a situation where their private interests affect or may affect the legality, openness, objectivity, or impartiality of the performance of public functions. The legal framework on conflicts of interest was adopted to prevent or to sanction situations in which public officials, through their role, can benefit themselves or persons who are their family members or with whom they are otherwise related.

As mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, two segments need to be distinguished in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the one hand, there are the conflicts of interest of elected or appointed officials, which is always in the public spotlight. On the other hand, there are the conflicts of interest of civil servants in administrative bodies.

At the end of 2020, Transparency International BiH published the Register of Public Officials, which currently includes data on 763 office-holders. According to Transparency International BiH, 61 officials at the state, entity, and cantonal levels now hold additional positions in public institutions and public enterprises. Many of them are in direct or partial conflict of interest. Thus, the Register shows that many public officials perform two or three functions in the public sector where their private interests often intertwine with public ones.

Despite the fact that Kosovo* has a clear legal framework to combat conflict of interest, this phenomenon continues to be present in public authorities. Conflict of interest is punished by the Criminal Code of Kosovo* as a criminal offence and the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of a Public Function for cases that do not constitute a criminal offence.

Kosovo*'s legal framework includes other laws aimed at combatting corruption, such as: Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering, Law on the Protection of Whistle-blowers, Law on Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in Discharge of a Public Function, and Law of Extended Powers on Confiscation of Asset. In addition to laws, Kosovo* has adopted strategic documents in order to strengthen the fight against corruption. Among them are: National Strategy for Development 2016-2021, State Strategy against Corruption and Action Plan 2018-2022, Strategic Plan of the National Audit Office 2018-2021 and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2021-2023.

The Anti-Corruption Agency has been operating in Kosovo* since 2010. This agency was established by the Law on Anti-Corruption Agency, which regulates its organisation and functioning. The Agency has competencies related to reporting, detection and investigation corruption. The Agency conducts a preliminary investigation procedure in cases of suspected corruption in the performance of official duties or based on information received from natural and legal persons. One of its main responsibilities is to supervise and prevent cases of conflict of interest. In 2020, the Anti-Corruption Agency handled more than 160 cases of conflict of interest,  a number slightly lower than the year before (167 cases in 2019). Out of 160 cases, 27 of them were cases reported in the local government.

According to the art.10 of the Integrity Law no.82 of 25.05.2017, the climate of institutional integrity, among others, is cultivated by observing the legal regime of conflicts of interest.

The Law no. 133 of 17.06.2016 on the declaration of assets and personal interests, in art.11, establishes the general principles of avoiding conflicts of interest, which must be observed by the subjects of the declaration, in the process of fulfilling their duties:

• serving the public interest with impartiality and objectivity;
• ensuring transparency and public control of the activity;
• individual responsibility and personal example.

At the same time, the Integrity Law no. 82 of 25.05.2017, in art.14 provides the obligations of the public agent and the head of the public entity related to the identification and treatment of conflicts of interest.

The control of conflicts of interest is carried out by the National Integrity Authority (ANI) in accordance with the provisions of the legislation regulating the NIA statute and of the legislation regarding the declaration and control of assets and personal interests.

Among the most recent developments in the regulation of the conflicts of interests is the establishment of an e-declaration system by the National Integrity Authority which became mandatory in January 2018, together with a mechanism for filing civil servants’ assets and conflict of interest statements. Compared to 2017, 2018 saw the number of declarations double thanks to the e-declaration system. Due to the e-Integrity information system, 65 232 declarations of assets and personal interests of civil servants were submitted in 2021, of which 6 052 statements were repetitive. The number of subjects of the declaration of assets and personal interests registered in the system was 57,028 in 2021.[iii]

The public agents must submit their electronic declarations annually through the on-line service available on the official website of the National Integrity Authority (ani.md) using the electronic signature issued for free, through the Special Telecommunications Centre, in the manner established by the Government.

Local authorities’ exposure to conflict of interest in Ukraine is considered to be very high and widespread because, unlike for Members of the Parliament, local councillors can combine their representative functions with other employment or entrepreneurship. At the same time, a survey of local authorities conducted in Cherkasy region in 2015 showed that only 15% of staff and local councillors fully understood the meaning of conflict of interest and its regulation.

According to Article 3 of the Law No. 9367 “On the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Exercise of Public Functions”, as amended, conflict of interest is a «situation of conflict between the public duty and the private interests of an official, in which he has direct or indirect private interests that affect, might affect or seem to affect the performance, in an incorrect way of his public responsibilities and duties».

Article 29 of the above stated law provides restrictions on mayors and chairmen of regional councils, who cannot be chairmen of CSOs, conduct economic activities, be members in managerial organs of private or civil society sectors, and possess shares or capital in a commercial company. The central authority responsible for the implementation of this law is the HIDAACI. In Article 44, this law provides a range of administrative penalties. Based on the type of conflict of interest, the fines range from ALL 30 000 to 500 000. The Law also stipulates disciplinary measures in Article 45.

Conflict of Interest is mentioned also in Article 4 of the Law No. 9131 “On the Rules of Ethics in the Public Administration”, Article 46 of the Law No. 152/2013 “On the Civil Servant”, and Article 26 of the Law No. 9643 dated 20.11.2006 “On Public Procurement”. Other related secondary legislation and HIDAACI regulations are important pieces of legislation related to Conflicts of Interest. Conflict of Interest is not provided as a criminal offence in the Albanian Criminal Code, even though it is mentioned in many laws, such as the law No. 9367 “On the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Exercise of Public Functions”.

According to the definition of the conflict of interests of public officials (except judges, deputies, prosecutors, investigators, members of the community council) given in the article 33 of the Law on Public Service, conflict of interest is a situation in which a person holding office performs an action or makes a decision in the exercise of their powers, which can reasonably be interpreted as being driven by their personal interests or that of a person affiliated with them.

The Law establishes some sets of incompatibility requirements and other restrictions for public officials and servants.

Incompatibility requirements: It is forbidden for them to hold positions that are not conditioned by their status in other state or local self-government bodies, any position in commercial organisations, to engage in entrepreneurial activity, to perform other paid work, except for scientific, educational and creative work․ It is also forbidden for them to accept a gift or agree to accept it later.

Other restrictions for public officials and servants include a ban on the following:

• representing the third party within the organisation where an official holds a position;
• entering into transactions on behalf ot the state with persons in close kinship and in-law relations;
• use the official position for the support of political parties, non-governmental organisation and religious organisations;
• receiving honorarium for publications or speeches related to the official responsibilities;
• using material-technical, financial and informational resources, other state and/or community assets and office-related data for personal or not-official purposes;
• working together with persons in close kinship or in-law relations;
• being hired by an employer under his / her immediate supervision within one year after leaving the official position.

The Law on Public Service states that in the case of conflict of interest, person holding public office is obliged to submit a written statement to his / her superior or direct supervisor on the circumstances of the conflict of interest. The written statement is subject to immediate examination. The person holding public office should not take any action before receiving instructions from the supervisor. In case of not having a superior or direct supervisor, the person holding public office may submit a written statement to CPC, which proposes to take steps to resolve the situation, including to make a statement on the existence of conflict of interests in a particular situation.

Conflict of interest cases of public servants are supposed to be pursued by the supervisors guided by the consultation of relevant institutions’ integrity officers and shall provide solutions to the conflict-of-interest situation. The responsibility for declaration of the conflict of interest lies with relevant public servants. If not declared, the cases can be reported through whistle-blowing mechanisms and followed up respectively.

Oversight and proceeding of conflict of cases during decision-making or action-taking by public officials or public servants is somewhat decentralised. As the Law on Public Service does not regulate the conflict of interest for MPs, judges, prosecutors, investigators and members of the community council, those are accordingly left to the jurisdiction of the respective laws – such as the Law on Guarantees for Activity of RA National Assembly Deputies (MPs), the Constitutional Law on the Judicial Code, Law on the Prosecutor's Office, the Law on the Special Investigation Service, the Law on the Investigative Committee, and the RA Law on Local Self-Government. None of those, however, contains any definitions of conflict of interests.

MPs: Article 4 of the Law on Guarantees for Activity of RA National Assembly Deputies (MPs) stipulates the conflict of interests for MPs as following: “…guided by his personal interests or the interests of his affiliated person means taking the floor with a legislative initiative, submitting a draft resolution, statement or address of the National Assembly, submitting proposals regarding an issue put into circulation in the National Assembly, as well as taking the floor at a sitting of the National Assembly or its committees, asking questions or participating in voting, which, although are legal in themselves, but the MP knows or is obliged to know that it leads or contributes, or reasonably may lead or contribute also:

1. to the improvement of his/her property or legal status and the property or legal status of his/her affiliated person;
2. to the improvement of the property or legal status of a non-profit organisation, of which the MP or his affiliated person is a member;
3. to the improvement of the property or legal status of a commercial organisation with the participation of an MP or his affiliated person;
4. to the appointment to the office of his affiliated person;
5. to his election or appointment to an office, with the exception of the offices specified in paragraph 5 of Article 2 of this Law, as well as his speech as a candidate for an office elected by the National Assembly.”

In the case of a conflict of interests, an MP is obliged to take the floor with a statement regarding the conflict of interests, and when taking the floor, shall submit their written statement regarding the conflict of interests with a description of the nature of interests.

Judges (including Members of the Supreme Judicial Council): The Constitutional Law on the Judicial Code regulates the conflict of interest for judges as well as Members of the Supreme Judicial Council. Article 70 (Code of Conduct of Judges during Acting in Official Capacities) part 2 point 7 of this law provides the code of conduct for this group of officials stating that the Judge shall not allow conflict of interest, shall exclude any influence of family, public or other type of relations to influence exercise of his / her official authorities. Hence, the conflict of interest for judges is formulated as a code of conduct and non-compliance will generate liability.

Prosecutors: Conflict of interest for prosecutors is regulated by the chapter on Code of Conduct of the Law on Prosecution. According to Article 72 (General Code of Conduct of Prosecutors) part 1 point 6 of this law, the prosecutor shall be autonomous and impartial, independent from influences from the legislative and executive and other state and local government institutions, public and political organisations, mass media outlets, private interests, public opinion and other external influences, pressures, threats and other interference, shall be free from the concerns to be criticised.  

Investigators: The Law on Investigation Committee does not contain provisions on the conflict of interest. Article 10 part 1 of this law prescribes that the servants of the Committee are governed by the Law on Public Service, which skips regulating the conflict of interest of investigators. There is no regulation on conflict of interest in the Law on the Special Investigation Service.

Members of Community Councils: Article 21 part 2 point 6 of the Law on Local Self-Government states that the Member of Community Council shall not take part in voting of a decision, which relates to his / her interests or the interests of persons in close kinship or in-law relations with him (parent, spouse, child, brother, sister).

To summarize, in spite of a wide volume of develop regulations, the Armenian legislation still has a number of deficiencies as does not ensure complete and holistic definition of the conflict of interest, and does not ensure effective mechanisms for the exposure and management of conflict of interest and liability measures for all the public officials and public servants.

Conflicts of interest of civil servants and employees in public administration bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina are regulated by the laws on civil service at the state and entity level, and the level of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The laws prescribe incompatibilities with the duties of civil servants in such a way that the functions, activities or positions that lead to a conflict of interest with the official duties of civil servants are listed exhaustively. Unlike the state and Federation of BiH law on civil service, the law of the Republika Srpska and the law of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina contain special provisions that define conflicts of interest, and how to act in the event of a conflict of interest.

The issue of conflicts of interest of elected officials, executive office-holders and advisers is regulated by four laws – the Law on Conflict of Interest in Government Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Law on Conflict of Interest in Government Bodies in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest Srpska, and the Law on Conflict of Interest in the Institutions of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Laws have been enacted to prevent and/or sanction situations in which public officials may themselves benefit or family members or persons otherwise related with them may benefit through the performance of their functions. The Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for law enforcement at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, in Republika Srpska, there is a special Commission for Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in Republika Srpska authorities. The Commission is formed by the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska as a first instance body and the Appeals Commission as a second instance body. Sanctions are envisaged for violating the law – measures prohibiting candidacy for any elected position for four years and fines in the range of BAM 1,000 to BAM 10,000.

In Kosovo*, conflict of interest as a corruptive phenomenon is regulated by the Criminal Code and more specifically by the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of a Public Function.

The Criminal Code regulates the situation when a conflict of interest causes a criminal offence. According to this Code, a conflict of interest is defined as the situation in which "an official person participates personally in any official matter in which he or she, knew or reasonably should have known, that he or she, a member of his or her family, or any related legal person, has a financial interest”. Based on the Code, conflict of interest is punished by a fine and imprisonment up to 3 years.

Conflict of interest is regulated in more detail by the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of a Public Function. The Law defines conflict of interest as “the situation in which, because of the circumstances, an official has a private interest which influences, might influence or seems to influence the impartial and objective performance of official duties”. This Law regulates conflict of interest as a form of corruption in cases where it does not constitute a criminal offence. The Law determines the principles, rules and procedures regarding the permitted and prohibited behaviour of officials during the performance of public duty. It also sets out the punitive measures in cases where the principles and provisions of this Law are not respected.

Article 23 to the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest regulates that any violation of those obligations that does not constitute a criminal offence is considered as a misdemeanour, punishable with a fine from €600 up to €15 000. Besides the fine, protective measures can be taken such as the prohibition of exercise of public functions for a period of 6 months to 2 years.

To facilitate the fight against conflict of interest in Kosovo*, the Council of Europe PECK 2 published a toolkit on Managing Conflict of Interest (2019). This toolkit was designed to assist officials and public institutions in recognizing the conflict of interest and complying with requirements of the Law on Prevention of Conflict of Interest in Discharge of a Public Function.

The legal framework providing the legal regime of conflicts of interest includes:

• Law no. 133 of 17.06.2016 on the declaration of assets and personal interests;
• Law no. 132 of 17.06.2016 on the National Integrity Authority;
• Integrity Law no. 82 of 25.05.2017.

According to Law no. 133 of 17.06.2016 on declaring assets and personal interests, a conflict of interest arises when the subject of the declaration has a personal interest that influences or could influence the impartial and objective exercise of his/her obligations and responsibilities under the law.

The Law no. 133 of 17.06.2016 on the declaration of assets and personal interests states in art. 13 the following categories of conflicts of interest:

• Potential - in this case the subject of the declaration has the obligation to declare a potential conflict of interest, and the hierarchically superior manager advises on avoiding the occurrence of a real conflict as an effect of the potential one.
• Real - in case of a real conflict of interest, until the adoption of a decision on the case, the subject of the declaration is obliged to inform the head or the hierarchically superior body about the real conflict of interest and to refrain from adopting a decision on the case. At the same time, art. 14 of the Law regulates in an exhaustive way the method for solving the real conflict of interests.
• After the fact - in this case, the head of the entity will inform the National Integrity Authority about the situations in which the persons working in the public organisation that she or he leads have admitted conflicts of interest, in order to sanction them.

As for the legal effect of acts issued, adopted or concluded with the violation of the provisions on conflict of interest, the Law (art. 15) establishes that they are annulled unless their annulment would harm the public interest.

Failure to declare and resolve the conflict of interests is sanctioned as a contravention (art. 313 of the Contravention Code of the Republic of Moldova, Law no. 218 of 24.10.2008), and the exercise of duties in the public sector in a conflict of interest is sanctioned criminally (art. 326 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova, Law no. 985 of 18.04.2002).

The Law “On Prevention of Corruption” differentiates between the potential (Article 1.8) and the real conflict of interest (Article 1.12). While the former indicates the potential for the private interest of the officials to affect impartiality in decision-making, the latter indicates that a contradiction between the private interest of the person and public functions as a civil servant or representative has already occurred. The violation of the law only occurs in decision-making when a conflict of interest has not been properly reported and resolved.

Since the definition of private interest is not limited to financial or material interests, such corruption risks as nepotism and patronage (provided below) are considered as subtypes of conflict of interest and they are regulated by the same legislation.

Prevention and regulation mechanisms on conflicts of interest are provided in the Chapter V (Articles 28-36) of the Law “On Prevention of Corruption”, in Article 59-1 of the Law “On Local Self-Governance in Ukraine”, and in the practical manual of the National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NACP).  The two main steps for prevention are: first, a decision-maker must report a conflict of interest, and second, abstain from taking decisions on issues under conflict of interest.

At local level, the special permanent commissions of local councils (Article 59-1 of the Law “On Local Self-Governance in Ukraine”) are responsible for consulting, monitoring and controlling the prevention and regulation of conflict of interests.

When a real conflict of interest is revealed, the NACP exhorts action from the authority involved. If the conflict of interest is not resolved within 10 days, the NACP reports an administrative violation.

According to the Article 172.7 of the Administrative Code of Ukraine, in the case of a real conflict of interest, a fine can range from 100 to 800 non-taxable minimum income, equivalent to UAH 1 700 and UAH 13 600, and the deprivation of the right to hold certain offices or engage in certain activities for one year. Information on corruption-related offences is collected in a single open database of individuals involved in corruption (corruptinfo.nazk.gov.ua), which damages the image of the perpetrator.

Only 8.2% of civil servants perceive embezzlement as very prevalent. In addition, according to public servants, embezzlement is one of the less witnessed corrupt practices. Despite of this perception given by public officials in the study, the practice shows that there are many cases of embezzlement reported by the Supreme State Audit. Moreover, there are some cases reported which have been successfully examined and ruled by the judiciary.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, embezzlement is one of the criminal offences of corruption, bribery and crimes against official and other responsible duties. Unlike some other criminal offences in this group, embezzlement is a criminal offence which, conditionally speaking, is "easier" to prove, in relation to criminal offences of "high corruption" (so-called white-collar corruption), for example, criminal offences committed by high political officials.

In addition to its negative impact on the implementation of national and municipal budget, embezzlement can also have grave consequences for the business sector and economic performance and can become a barrier to private and foreign investment, trade and economic development. Private companies may also be affected further by the impact of crime on their operations. This can range from extortion by organised criminal groups, to serious fraud and embezzlement of funds by managers, each of which has the potential to cause serious damage to the business environment in which companies operate and to increase the cost of doing business.

The Republic of Moldova has known a number of cases in which ghost companies stole Moldovan budget funds, ‘laundered dirty money’, embezzled budget money from public procurement, stole from the budget under the cover of litigations, etc.

An IMF Report from March 2020 points out the lack of progress in recovering fraudulently-acquired assets in the Republic of Moldova, specifically from perpetrators involved in the ‘grand theft’ of US$ 1 billion from the Moldovan banking system between 2012 and 2014. “Little progress has been made to recover assets stolen during the 2014 fraud when several money-laundering operations facilitated the theft of around 12% of GDP from the Republic of Moldova’s largest banks”, says the report.

With reference to the local level, according to National Anti-Corruption Center data in the field of prevention and combating corruption in the local public administration, in the first nine months of 2018, 60 criminal cases were started. Out of these, two criminal cases (3%) refer to the embezzlement of foreign property and specifically embezzlement of financial means in the process of performance of construction and repair works.

Embezzlement is widespread in Ukraine, especially in the field of public procurement, which is one of the most corruption-prone areas in the country. For instance, the OECD Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan from 2015 estimated that about 75% of funds allocated for procurement had been embezzled through various schemes between 2010 and 2014, amounting roughly to UAH 150 billion.

According to the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine, during 2016-2019, it registered 14 249 criminal offences related to the misappropriation of funds and property of state enterprises and other entities financed by the state and local budgets. The established amount of material damage is 2 288 470.6 thousand UAH, seized property worth 1 011 185.4 thousand UAH.

As defined in Article 248 of the Criminal Code, abuse of office is understood as the «deliberate accomplishment or non-accomplishment of actions or failures to act, in violation to the law and constituting the failure of a person, who carries out public functions, to do his duties regularly, in cases when it has led to bringing him or other persons unjust material or non-material benefits or when it has brought damages to the legitimate interests of the state, citizens, and other legal entities, when it does not constitute another criminal offence, is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years».

In addition, based on article 246, «appropriating a public title or office accompanied with the actions pertinent to the holder of the title or office, constitutes criminal contravention and is punishable by a fine or up to two years of imprisonment. If the act is committed for embezzlement purposes or has encroached the freedom, dignity or other fundamental rights of the citizen, it is punishable by a fine or up to five years of imprisonment».

Embezzlement is mentioned also in Article 57 of the Law No. 152/2013 “On the Civil Servant”, and in Article 13 of the Law No. 9131 “On the Rules of Ethics in the Public Administration”.

Embezzlement in the service referred to in Article 221 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 384 of the Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and HerzegovinaA, or Embezzlement under Article 348 of the Criminal Code of Republika Srpska and Article 378 of the Criminal Code of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina implies the misappropriation of money, valuables or other movable assets  by a person to whom they are entrusted in the service of or in general at work in public institutions at all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the intention of obtaining illegal property gain for themselves or others. Thus, the act consists of the misappropriation of money, securities or other movable assets, and the consequence of the action consists of obtaining for oneself or for another person some benefit, or in causing some harm to another, or more severe violation of another's rights. The perpetrator of a criminal offence can only be an official or responsible person, and intent is required with regard to guilt. The prescribed sanction for this criminal offence is imprisonment in the range of six months to five years or, for a more severe form of the offence, imprisonment in the range of one to ten years.

Embezzlement is considered a criminal offence and it is regulated by the Criminal Code of Kosovo*. According to Article 418 of the Code “an official person, who intentionally obtains an unlawful material benefit for himself, herself or another person, appropriates property entrusted to him or her because of his or her duty or position shall be punished by a fine and imprisonment of six (6) months to five (5) years.”

In cases when the damages of this offence are greater, the law provides for other sentences of imprisonment. When the loss exceeds €5 000, the offender will be punished by a fine and imprisonment of 1 to 8 years, whereas when the loss exceeds €50 000 the offender will be punished by a fine and imprisonment of 3 to 12 years.

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova (Law No. 985-XV of 18 April 2002) currently sets the provisions and sanctions related to embezzlement.

The misappropriation of foreign property (i.e. the misappropriation of the assets of another person) entrusted to the administration of an individual is punishable by a fine of up to 850 conventional units (they are used when calculating penalties for tax crimes; at the moment it is set at MDL 50) or by imprisonment for up to three years, in both cases with or without deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or to practice certain activities for a term of up to three years. Where committed by use of an official position, as per Article 191(d), embezzlement is punishable by a fine in the amount of 850 to 1,350 conventional units or by imprisonment for two to six years, in both cases with the deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or to practice certain activities for up to five years.

Embezzlement falls under the category of economic crimes or crimes against property in the Criminal Code. According to the Article 191, paragraph 2, the penalty for embezzlement in public office can reach 5 years’ imprisonment or 3 years’ deprivation of the right to hold certain public offices or engage in certain activities. Depending on the embezzled amount, the penalty increases up to 12 years’ imprisonment, and 3 years’ deprivation of the right to hold certain public offices or engage in certain activities, and confiscation of property.

Based on study results, 36.7% of civil servants perceive fraud as a more or less prevalent corrupt practice in the Albanian civil service. Men dominate among those having witnessed embezzlement, fraud and influencing of unfair decisions. Measures to stamp out fraud are contained in the New Customs Code, which as regards Customs offenses and penalties, is based on the proposal of the European Commission and on best practices of EU member states. The new tax administration IT-system allows a simplification of processes and reduces the opportunities for fraud and corruption. As per the Law No. 112/2015 “On Public Financial Inspection”, the Anti-Fraud Coordination Service (AFCOS) is appointed in Albania to facilitate the co-operation with relevant institutions in the European Union.

According to the official statistics on the results of the investigation of corruption crimes, published by the General Prosecution Service of the Republic of Armenia, in 2017 there have been 21 registered cases of fraud committed by persons using official position, with charges brought against individuals in 18 cases.

Registered cases of fraud increased almost ten times in 2018, with a total of 206 registered cases. Despite the increase of registered cases in 2018, charges were put forward in only 63 cases.

In 2019, 236 cases of fraud committed by persons using official position were registered by the General Prosecution Service of the Republic of Armenia, out of which only 86 were pursued.

In 2020, 179 cases of fraud committed by persons using official position were registered, out of which only 38 were pursued.

As it is clear, this type of crime has increased in recent years while the rate of its prosecution has decreased significantly. The 2019-2022 Anti-Corruption Strategy and its Action Plan does not include any activities related to combating fraud.

All forms of corruption are practised in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fraud (in-service) is often associated with abuse of office or authority, and forgery of documents, and is often prosecuted as multiple criminal offences.

In Kosovo*, fraud is part of the group of official corruption offences and criminal offences against official duty. Fraud in public office, like other forms of corruption, continues to be an obstacle to Kosovo*'s institutional and sustainable development. Fraud in public institutions and officials affects the loss of public money, distortion of public expenditures and may prevent foreign investment. All these actions negatively affect the effectiveness and efficiency of government actions. In most cases, fraud is committed in conjunction with other offences such as embezzlement and abuse of official position. Cases of fraud are found in those who hold important public positions such as mayors or public officials. Despite its spread, according to the 2016 Public Pulse survey on Corruption, fraud remains as one of the least common forms of proven corruption (14%) by citizens.

During the past couple of years, the Republic of Moldova has been severely affected by what was called the ”theft of the century”. In late 2014 a huge corruption case hit the Republic of Moldova, the infamous ”one-billion-dollar bank fraud”. The scandal, involving three of the largest banks of the country, Banca de Economii, Banca Socială and Unibank, holding approximately one third of the country’s assets at the time, put the fragile Moldovan economic and banking system severely at risk, robbing the country of at least one billion dollars, around 15% of its annual GDP. Expert analysis and investigations showed that this operation was conducted in a highly coordinated, structured way and was made possible thanks to the support of key financial and political institutions. Experts argue that little or no progress has been made in recovering the assets from the bank fraud. There is no indication as to whether the Republic of Moldova requested the mutual legal assistance of foreign jurisdictions on starting the recovery of the stolen assets.

Based on Article 143 of the Criminal Code fraud is defined as «stealing property through lies or abuse of trust is punishable by a fine or up to five years of imprisonment. This very act, when committed in complicity in the detriment of several persons, or more than once, is punished by imprisonment from two to six years and, when it brings about serious consequences, it is sentenced by imprisonment from five to ten years».

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia sets provisions and sanctions related to fraud, through Chapter 21 Article 178, stating: “1. Swindling, i.e. theft of a significant amount or misappropriation of somebody’s property rights by cheating or abuse of confidence, is punished with a fine in the amount of 200-500 minimum salaries, or with arrest for the term of up to 2 months, or with imprisonment for the term of up to 2 years”. Part 2 of the above-mentioned article establishes criminal liability for committing similar actions by a person using official position. When committed by use of an official position, fraud is punishable by a fine in the amount of 500-1000 minimum salaries or by imprisonment for a term of 2-5 years. Part 3 of the same Article states that the similar actions, committed on a large scale or by an organised group, shall be punished by imprisonment from 4-8 years with or without confiscation of property.

The Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Armenia, Article 190, states that the preliminary investigation of the cases on crimes under Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Armenia is carried out by police investigators.

One of the corrupt criminal offences in Bosnia and Herzegovina is fraud in service under Article 222 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Article 385 of the Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 379 of the Criminal Code of Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Article 317 of the Criminal Code of Republika Srpska. This criminal offence is a particular form of fraud committed by an official or responsible person with the intention of obtaining illegal property gain for himself or another by submitting false accounts or misleading an authorised person to make a prohibited payment. The difference between this crime and the ordinary crime of fraud is reflected in the fact that in this crime the focus is on the violation of the lawful performance of official duties. Thus, the act of the offence consists of misleading the authorised person in such a way as to create a misconception about specific facts, on the basis of which the authorised person would commit some illegal act during the performance of the service. For committing this criminal offence, imprisonment in the range of six months to ten years is envisaged, depending on the amount of illegally obtained property gain.

Fraud is punishable under the Criminal Code of Kosovo*. According to Article 323, fraud is defined as the presentation of false facts, concealment of facts or the use of other fraudulent methods for the purpose of unlawful gain or material damage to another. A person who commits fraud will be punished by a fine and imprisonment of 3 months to 5 years. This article regulates the situation when the object of fraud is to obtain an unlawful benefit from public funds or a public institution. In this case, the offender will be punished by a fine and imprisonment of 2 to 8 years.

The Criminal Code regulates fraud in office as a form of criminal offence. According to Article 419, a public official commits fraud when s/he obtains material benefits for himself/herself or someone else, by creating, using or presenting a false statement of an account. A fraud also happens when a public official deceives an authorized person into making an unlawful disbursement of money, transfer of property or other rights. The Criminal Code punishes fraud with a fine and imprisonment of 6 months to 5 years.

Data show that recruitment procedures in Albania’s public sector suffer from lack of transparency. More than 36% of applicants who did not get a job think that somebody else was employed due to cronyism or nepotism, while an additional 25% believe that somebody else was hired due to bribery. Nepotism prevails among the most witnessed corrupt practices at the workplace, which may be because Albania is a country where social networks are very strong. Due to that, many nepotistic practices in Albania are based on the personal relationships and the network of social interactions.

In Armenia, favouritism in the form of nepotism and cronyism is considered a governing problem – widespread at both central and local levels.

According to public opinion survey of 2019, 87-98 % of respondents did not encounter corruption when dealing with government officials. At the same time, 42% - the largest portion of respondents - thought that the most common current form of corruption is favouritism, including nepotism and cronyism. In comparison to the data from 2010, the prevalence of favouritism within other forms of corruption is now about 22 % higher than before and obviously more noticeable.

Nepotism has been a daily occurrence in Bosnia and Herzegovina for many years, but it is not explicitly criminalised. Nepotism, bribery, and corruption have become a way of life in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the existing legislative framework is perfectly suited to those who practise nepotism. "Political parties are trying in all possible ways to maintain control over employment in public institutions, public companies and the like, and are therefore not ready to improve the laws." On the other hand, the presence of political influence on the judiciary contributes greatly to the impunity of abuses. Arbitrary rulings mean that a blind eye is turned to the malpractice of putting private interests before the interests of the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the main concerns of the citizens of Kosovo* continues to be nepotism. Most citizens have been victims or witnesses of nepotism, especially during the employment process. Opinion polls done by Public Pulse XIX, show that 21.9% of respondents consider that employment in the public sector is merit-based while 78.1% consider that employment in the public sector is not based on merit. It also shows that the respondents consider the following main factors to gain employment in the public sector: party allegiance 23.3%, family connections 23.2%, bribe 20.3%, education 11.2%, friends 8.9% and to a lesser extent vocational training 6.6%, professional experience 4.1% and appearance 2.1%.  As a result, we find unprofessional employment of people who do not meet the necessary criteria for that position. This ongoing problem has shaken citizens' trust in the work of government bodies.

Clientelism and nepotism tend to be persistent in the Republic of Moldova year after year. The most negative effect of maintaining clientelism and nepotism in the country is endemic corruption.

The most prevalent form of corruption in the Republic of Moldova, according to experts, is favouritism in public procurement (83%), followed by nepotism in appointing public officials (48%) and conflicts of interests (48%). Experts also believe that there is a high concern amongst citizens about the prevalence of favouritism in public procurement, thus reflecting a much higher awareness of the public regarding institutional distortions in the Republic of Moldova. A Transparency International report states that “the level of tolerance for corruption is very high. The public considers that corruption and nepotism are culturally bound and cannot be reduced.”

The same report suggests two important measures that might help the country address the issue of nepotism:

• Elaboration of a mechanism of declaration of incomes and ownership for high-ranking public officers and their relatives while undertaking and being freed from the position.
• Reduction of staff in public sector, and the de-politicisation of the government, by introducing an obligatory system of professional promotion on the basis of performance and competitiveness.

In the 2016 Ukrainian Municipal Survey, 56% of respondents respectively indicated that nepotism is a “significant problem” and 29% identified it as “somewhat a problem”. Nepotism in Ukraine is close to the phenomenon of kumivstvo (the “godparent relationship”) or to cronyism. In the case of cronyism, the exchange of favours and privileges is based on close friendship ties.

In Albania, there is no specific law on nepotism. However, Article 5 (“Private Interests”) of the Law No. 9367 “On the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Exercise of Public Functions” mentions private interests of an official as those interests that conform with, contain, are based on or come from relationships of family or cohabitation, of friendship, and any other juridical civil relationship, among others.

On 27 January 2006, two decisions of the Council of Ministers were approved. The decision of the Council of Ministers No.43 “On avoiding nepotism and influence of power on the hiring and career of personnel of the public administration” and the decision of Council of Ministers No.44 “On avoiding nepotism in the public administration” which provides:

“Employees related to each other by family relationship, cognation or marriage are prohibited from exercising their duties within a public institution. The cause for the termination of employment is the existence of any of the following connections:

a) family ties: spouse / cohabitant, son, daughter, and their children.

b) cognation relations: parents, siblings and their children, aunts or uncles.

c) family relationship: parent, child, brother / sister of the spouse, as well as spouse / cohabitant of the children”.

However, these decisions were deemed as incompatible with the Constitution.

 The Constitutional Court found that the above-mentioned decisions imposed a restriction on the right to work for the citizens.  The right to work is guaranteed under Article 49 of the Constitution.

“Everyone has the right to earn a living by lawful employment, which he has chosen or accepted. They are free to choose the profession, the job, as well as the system of his professional qualification.”

Also, Article 17 of the Constitution guarantees that:

1. Restrictions on the rights and freedoms provided for in this Constitution may be imposed only by law for a public interest or for the protection of the rights of others. The restriction must be in proportion to the situation which has dictated it.

2. These restrictions may not infringe the essence of the freedoms and rights and in no case may they exceed the restrictions laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The Constitutional Court considers that this provision, in the way it is formulated, has not left the possibility of delegation to any state authority other than the Parliament, as a representative body. The expression "only by law" means that if it is necessary to limit a right provided for in the Constitution, then this assessment is at the discretion of the legislator and not to other bodies, including the Council of Ministers.

The unconstitutionality of the decisions not only lies in the fact that the decisions of the Council of Ministers have an effect on previously established relationships, but also because of violation of the principle of proportionality, as employees affected by these decisions were not provided with another job

Related to the regulations made by the decisions of the Council of Ministers regarding the retroactive effects, it should be noted that even if these restrictions were made by law, according to the criteria of Article 17/1 of the Constitution, the principles mentioned above should be applied.

For these reasons, these decisions are invalidated as incompatible with the Constitution.

With the invalidation of these decisions of the Council of Ministers, the legislation on nepotism remains weak, as the only related legal provision is Article 5 (“Private Interests”) of the Law No. 9367 “On the Prevention of Conflicts of Interest in the Exercise of Public Functions”, as amended. Nepotism is not foreseen as a criminal offence in Albania but it is considered an administrative offence and it is punished by a fine varying from 50’000 ALL to 300’000 ALL.

Currently, there is no legislation that would explicitly prohibit or criminalise nepotism in Armenia. Nevertheless, the necessity of fair hiring practices is stipulated in the Law on Public Service of Armenia, which also provides several indirect regulations and limitations of nepotism.

Article 32 of the Law on Public Service prohibits public officials to be in direct subordination or have under direct subordination any persons related to them by close kinship or guardianship. Failure to comply with the prescribed restrictions will result in disciplinary action for public officials and public servants. The provisions on disciplinary liability do not apply to officials holding political office and may be applied to officials holding autonomous positions only in cases provided by law.

Article 39 of the "Content of the Declaration" chapter of the Law on Public Service defines the general data on the declaring official, his / her family composition and persons related by close kinship and guardianship. Article 42 of the Law on Public Service (Declaration of Interest) requires the incumbent to declare participation in commercial or non-commercial organisations, management of commercial or non-commercial organisations, representation in administrative or supervisory bodies, transfer of a commercial organisation's share to trust management, membership in parties and their management, representation in the supervisory or administration bodies, information on his / her or his / her family members’ representation, as well as information on the agreements concluded with the Republic of Armenia or the communities by the organisations with their participation.

Article 32 of the Law on Public Service also sets prohibitions for the persons holding public office and public servants, as a representative of the state, to conclude property transactions with persons related to them by close kinship or guardianship, except for the cases provided by the legislation of the Republic of Armenia.

There is no criminal offence of nepotism in the criminal laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given that nepotism primarily refers to the employment of close relatives in public sector bodies, the law on civil service in administrative bodies of different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be relevant and applicable if the provisions on the incompatibility of circumstances with the duties of civil servants, for example conflicts of interest, include provisions prohibiting work under the guidance of a close relative. On the other hand, conflict of interest laws indirectly define nepotism, stipulating that a conflict of interest exists in situations where an elected official, executive or adviser has a private interest that may affect the impartial and objective performance of his or her function, whereby private interest implies any advantage for her/him or her/his family or other persons or organisations with which he has had or has business, political and other connections. Elected officials, executive office-holders and public advisers must not place their private interest above the public interest.

The Sarajevo Canton has made a big step forward in this regard. Namely, in April 2021, the Assembly of Sarajevo Canton adopted the draft Law on Prevention of Nepotism and Party Employment in Public Sector Bodies in Sarajevo Canton. The law prevents work under the leadership of a close relative and other cases of conflict of interest. It prohibits nepotism and party employment in administrative bodies, public companies, public institutions and legal entities founded by the Sarajevo Canton. The law was drafted based on a comprehensive analysis of international and legal acts of EU member states that relate to the prevention of nepotism and party employment in public sector bodies. This move represents a significant step of the Sarajevo Canton Government towards transparency and openness in its work.

Currently there is no legislation that would explicitly prohibit or criminalise nepotism. Nevertheless, the necessity of fair hiring practices is stipulated in the Law on the Civil Service of Georgia and can also be derived from the Code of Conduct regulation adopted by Government Decree in 2017.

Currently, Kosovo* does not have a specific law that regulates or prohibits nepotism. Nevertheless, Article 414 of the Criminal Code is used to prosecute and punish nepotism as a form of corruption. This article punishes an official person in cases when s/he takes advantage of his/her position or authority to acquire any benefit for himself/herself or another person, to cause damage to another person or to seriously violate the rights of another person. Thus, this article is used in those cases when a public official abuses his or her position by hiring a family member or friend, offering an employment that exceeds his/her competencies and violates the rights of other applicants.

Article 414 is also used in conjunction with Article 219 of the Criminal Code. This article establishes the violation of employment and unemployment rights as a criminal offence. Based on this article “anyone who denies or restricts to other persons the right to employment under the same conditions, as defined by law, shall be punished by a fine or by imprisonment of up to two (2) years”. Since nepotism results in the violation of a person’s right to employment on an equal footing with others, Article 219 is also used to detect and punish this form of corruption.

The provision of any support, preferences, privileges or creation of advantages to some individuals or legal entities in decision-making undertaken during the exercise of the position of public agent, whenever these actions are carried out for the benefit of the relatives is called nepotism. The Law on Integrity No. 82 of 25 May 2017, introduced a policy for the Avoidance of favoritism through Article 15. Therefore, for the purpose of ensuring the serving for the public interest with impartiality and objectivity, the public agents shall avoid favoritism in their professional activity.

The public agent shall not admit favoritism in his/her professional activity, observe the obligations in line with the provisions set forth in art.13 of the same law, whenever the situation leading to favoritism meets the elements of a conflict of interest. The head of the public entity, of the superior public entity shall not admit intentionally favoritism practices in the professional activity of the public agents, should report the cases of favoritism to the National Anti-Corruption Center.

The Law on Assets and Personal Interest Declaration No.133 of 17 June 2016, as well as the legislation on access to information and other normative acts do foresee the publication of key data, including information about public service enrolment and leadership of public organisations, allowing citizens to monitor and to inform accordingly the National Integrity Authority of any misconduct.

According to the Evaluation Study on the Impact of National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017 developed by UNDP, hiring and promoting public servants at work is usually done on the basis of merit (according to 84% of public officials) and based on the evaluation of employee performance (72%). However, one in five public officials states that favouritism (relationships with the right people) and political affiliation are often practiced. The level of knowledge of the legal/illegal situations regarding the employment and promotion of public agents based on merit and professional integrity is very low. Thus, only 7% of public officials provided correct answers to all possible situations of corruption in the process of hiring and promoting public officials on the basis of merit and professional integrity.

In Ukraine, there is no specific law on nepotism. However, the Law “On Prevention of Corruption” and the Law “On Public Service” provide several indirect regulations and limitations to nepotism.

Section 27 of the Law “On Prevention of Corruption” prohibits public officials to be in direct subordination or have in direct subordination any close persons. In case such subordination occurs, an official is obliged to report and undertake measures to resolve the situation, as in the case of conflict of interest. Accordingly, the subordinated person is required to either change the position to avoid direct subordination to the close person, or to resign.

In 2020 the Law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning Restrictions on Joint Work of Related Persons” was adopted. It stipulates that local councillors of Ukraine, members of the Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, elected representatives of local councils, village, settlement, city mayors may not be directly subordinated to their relatives or be directly subordinated in connection with the exercise of powers to their relatives. The law withdraws the exception of hiring a close person as an assistant consultant of a local councillor, member of the Parliament or elected representatives. Thereafter such form of nepotism is prohibited.

The misuse or abuse of administrative resources (sometimes referred to as “public resources” or “state resources”) during parliamentary and local election campaigns in Albania has been one of the most recurrent concerns over the last two decades, as reported by international election observers. In the context of the parliamentary elections of 2017, the Parliament convened an extraordinary session on 22 May 2017 to take actions related to the electoral process. Among other measures, a political agreement between the two main parties led to the establishment of an inter-ministerial structure in the form of a Task Force to prevent the abuse of public officials in the electoral process. Also, to prevent the risks of the misuse of administrative resources, penalties were introduced for public servants who might be involved in campaigning.

Although significant steps have been made at national, local and regional levels, elections have their own characteristics, which make them especially vulnerable to the misuse of administrative resources. Therefore, specific actions may be required for local and regional elections.

At the local and regional levels, elected representatives usually have personal ties to the territorial community in which the election takes place. Likewise, their relation to public employees and civil servants working for the municipality is often particularly close.

Moreover, local elected representatives and/or employees frequently have functions which are relevant during the electoral campaign, such as the allocation of places for campaigning. Municipal employees may also have tasks related to the preparation of the elections, for instance, as members of polling station commissions.  Such functions may give them possibilities of interference in favour of the incumbent or the party/parties in power, which may be problematic in local and regional elections.

Public trust in elections in Armenia used to be very low. According to a Gallup survey in 2011, only 13% of women and 12% of men believed in the honesty of elections. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) final report on the 2017 parliamentary elections in Armenia urged authorities and political parties to increase public trust in elections. Low level of trust in the electoral system was mostly explained by the widespread electoral fraud lasted for about two decades both at the national and local levels to achieve the favourable results. Reports of both national and international observation missions kept recording multiple violations and making recommendations for policy change.

Major turn in the electoral practices happened only after the velvet revolution of 2018, when the new political leadership developed a favourable legislative framework and supported environment for the expression of the free will of citizens.

The Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) final report on the 9 December, 2018 early Parliamentary elections, found that the election held enjoyed the protection of fundamental freedoms and were widely enjoyed by the public trust. The delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) too concluded that the mentioned elections were held with due regard for fundamental freedoms and enjoyed broad public trust that needs to be preserved through further electoral reforms. For the first time in many years the elections were assessed by the major local observer initiatives – Akanates and Independent Observer, as truly competitive, free and fair.

The national and international observation mission reports on the Snap Elections to the RA National Assembly on 20 June 2021 showed that numerous manifestations of abuse of administrative resources several political parties or alliances, including coercion to participate in or refuse to participate in rallies and obstruction of the exercise of the voter’s free will took place. The OSCE / ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions of 20 June 2021 Early Parliamentary Elections in Armenia, found that allegations of the misuse of administrative resources also persisted throughout the campaign. Nevertheless, the elections were generally assessed as competitive and free that allowed for the full exercise of the citizens will.

Komplicirana politička i izborna struktura u Bosni i Hercegovini, stvorena Daytonskim mirovnim sporazumom 1995. godine i danas predstavlja plodno tlo za razne zloupotrebe, pa tako i za zloupotrebe javnih resursa u izbornim kampanjama. Zbog etničkih podjela, biračko tijelo unaprijed je podijeljeno i određeno. Većina glasa prema etno-nacionalnoj pripadnosti, a nakon izbora „političari mogu „vratiti“ usluge dobijene tokom kampanje davanjem olakšica i zapošljavanjem u državnoj službi, favoriziranjem ugovora o nabavkama i davanjem drugih doprinosa svojim pristalicama“.

„Zloupotrebu javnih resursa u izbornoj kampanji predstavlja i korištenje javnih medijskih servisa, koji su javna preduzeća finansiranja iz budžeta, a koje vladajuće partije koriste u propagandne svrhe, ne samo kroz plaćeno oglašavanje, već, što je mnogo opasnije, kroz kontrolu nad uređivačkom politikom javnih servisa, koji posljedično u pozitivnom svjetlu predstavljaju vladajuću stranku i njene funkcionere“.

Upečatljiv primjer zloupotrebe službenih resursa u političke svrhe je slučaj dolaska direktorice Kliničkog centra Univerziteta u Sarajevo u posjetu Kliničkom centru Tuzla službenim automobilom registriranim na Kabinet bošnjačkog člana Predsjedništva BiH – njenog supruga Bakira Izetbegovića.

Primjer zloupotrebe službenih resursa u predizbornim kampanjama je slučaj korištenja helikopterske službe Vlade Republike Srpske za obilazak predizbornih skupova. Tako se član Predsjedništva Bosne i Hercegovine iz srpskog naroda, Milorad Dodik od početka predizborne kampanje pojavio na najmanje sedam izbornih skupova Saveza nezavisnih socijaldemokrata (SNSD), čije se mjesto i vrijeme poklapaju sa odredištima helikopterskih letova "AV 119" (AW 119). ), koji je u vlasništvu Vlade Republike Srpske.

In 2017, amendments to the Election Code of the Republic of Moldova changed the electoral system from fully proportional to a mixed one. Under the new system, 50 Members of the Parliament are elected through proportional representation from closed party lists in one national constituency and 51 Members of the Parliament in single member constituencies through the first-past-the-post system. In order to win seats in the national constituency, a party must receive at least 6% of the valid votes, while an electoral bloc needs at least 8%. ODIHR and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) have consistently recommended lowering the thresholds.

The Social Impact report on the Accountability in Moldova USAID-funded project (February 2020) states that “voters in the Republic of Moldova have little confidence that the political parties represent their interests.” According to the Public Opinion Barometer in 2019, over 50% of Moldovans believed that no political party or civic formation represented their interests, and only 49% reported voting during the 2019 parliamentary elections.

The latest local elections in the Republic of Moldova took place in October 2019, and according to a Promo-LEX report, 898 mayors’ offices and 11,580 offices of first-level and second-level local councillors (100 fewer than in 2015) were to be taken up in the last general local elections. The term of office for local elected officials is four years.

Overall, the pre-election period was characterised by dominant themes such as the oligarchisation/capture of the state and the efficient management of administrative-territorial units, as opposed to geopolitical issues and the pro-Russian or pro-EU vectors of discourse prevalent in previous local elections. 

In the context of general local elections and new parliamentary elections, considerable attention was given to several issues concerning the misuse of administrative resources – for example, the use of public assets and/or public office for electoral purposes. At least eight cases have been reported in this category, three of which covered the ACUM electoral bloc, two – the PSRM, the other two – the PDM and one case – the PCRM. Electoral assemblies organised at state institutions with their employees during their working hours remain to be a persistent practice of electoral candidates. During the electoral period, at least 152 cases were reported of candidates holding such meetings.

In its report from October 2019 the ENEMO International Election Observation Mission raised concerns regarding allegations of misuse of administrative resources, namely the involvement of mayors’ office workers, as well as independent candidates using their official positions to influence the election campaign. Another concern was the use of mayoral property and resources for campaigning.

On 22 May 2017, in the above-mentioned context of reforms, the Parliament of Albania approved amendments to the election legal framework. These amendments were adopted to the Law No. 8580, “On Political Parties”, the Law No. 97/2013 “On Audio-visual Media”, and the Criminal Code. The amendments introduced new requirements to campaigning, campaign finance, and advertising in broadcast media, as well as established new electoral offences and increased sanctions for existing ones. However, the reform process lacked transparency and consultation with stakeholders, and the late timing created significant difficulties in the implementation of key aspects of the election administration.

The amendments to the Law No. 8580 “On Political Parties” aimed to limit campaign spending. They largely constrained the use of electoral promotion materials at urban level and prohibited paid political advertising in media outlets, television, and radio channels. Furthermore, Article 88 of the Electoral Code of Albania prohibits the use of public resources for the support of electoral subjects.

In line with the amendments to the Law No. 8580 “On Political Parties”, the revision of the Law No. 97/2013 “On Audiovisual Media” determined the prohibition of paid political advertising in media outlets during the electoral period. However, the legal framework still fails to regulate political advertising, paid or unpaid, hidden or direct, beyond the electoral period, as well as in written and online media within or beyond the electoral campaign.

As regards the Criminal Code, Articles 325-332 (Chapter X) provide for 15 criminal offences which threaten the freedom and integrity of free elections.^[i] The new criminal offenses introduced in 2017 include the abuse of public function for electoral activities, the use of other peoples’ identification documents, and more detailed prohibitions on vote-buying and vote-selling. Article 328/a (Using the public function for public electoral activities) is of a particular relevance:

«The use of the public goods, the function or the state activity or of the financial or human resources by an employee, who carries out a state duty, to favour a political party or a candidate in the elections constitutes a criminal offence and is punishable by imprisonment of one year to three years».

Armenian legislation on the regulation or prohibition of use of administrative resources during the election campaigning, remains deficient, even though the legal framework has been recently modified and largely improved.

Article 23 of the Electoral Code of Armenia establishes restrictions for the election campaign, including the prohibition of the use of administrative resources. The code states that candidates who are public servants shall not campaign when undertaking official duties. They also cannot abuse official position in the interest of their party. The law also restricts the use of resources that are given to public officials to implement their official duties. It is forbidden to use the premises, means of transport, means of communication, material and human resources provided for the performance of official duties for the purpose of pre-election campaign.

The legal framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina does not adequately identify the misuse of administrative resources in election campaigns because the regulations do not contain provisions regulating the conduct of civil servants, the use of state, or administrative and other resources during the election period.

Although civil service laws prescribe the professional impartiality of civil servants by prohibiting civil servants from membership in political parties and working under the instructions of political parties, no special provisions regulate “the ability of civil servants to participate in campaign activities or participate in political work, either during or after business hours ".

Article 7.2 of the BiH Election Law stipulates that the competent municipal authorities are obliged to ensure equal treatment of parties and candidates in their requests to "use public places and public facilities for campaign purposes, including holding gatherings, displaying advertisements, posters and placards". Paragraph 3 of this article stipulates that “the competent authorities shall not allow political parties, coalitions, lists of independent candidates and independent candidates to place advertisements, posters, or to write their names or slogans related to the election campaign, within or on buildings housing authorities at all levels, public enterprises, public institutions and local communities, on religious buildings, on public roads and public areas, except in places provided for billboards and advertising ”.

Although Article 7.3 exhaustively lists what is not allowed for candidates and supporters of political parties, lists of independent candidates, lists of members of national minorities and coalitions, as well as independent candidates and their supporters, and employees or otherwise engaged in the election administration, it does not mention the use of official vehicles (and even helicopters) for political purposes, which is a very common occurrence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Law on Financing of Political Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina explicitly prohibits the financing of political parties by public companies, but also by private companies that have concluded a public procurement contract with the executive authorities at all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina if the value of the contract in one calendar year exceeds the amount of BAM 10,000.00.

The legislation in the Republic of Moldova on the use of administrative resources during the election period, and election campaigning in particular, is deficient according to a Promo-LEX report. Even though the legal framework has been modified, the problem of explicit and full regulation of the use of administrative resources still remains unsolved.

Article 52 (7) of the Electoral Code on Electoral Campaign stipulates that candidates may not use public means and goods (administrative resources) during electoral campaigns, while public authorities/institutions and other related institutions may not send/grant public goods or other benefits to candidates unless a contract is concluded to this end, providing equal terms to all candidates. According to Article 22 (2) of the Central Electoral Commission General Duties, the Central Electoral Commission has the right to access the information held by public authorities at all levels, including access personal data, in compliance with the legislation on personal data protection.

The Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova has two important articles in this regard: Article 181 (1), Corruption of Voters, which is punishable by a fine ranging from 500 to 850 conventional units or by imprisonment between 1 to 5 years; and Article 181 (2), Illegal financing of political parties or electoral campaigns, violation of the management of financial means of political parties or electoral funds, which stipulates the penalties applied for the falsification of reports on the financial management of political parties and/or of reports on the financing of electoral campaigns with the intention to substitute or hide the identity of the donors.

According to experts, the legal framework should provide a clear jurisdiction in case of electoral complaints on the misuse of administrative resources both by candidates and third parties, to provide an effective enforcement mechanism that would prevent potential violation.

Extortion has been a problematic criminal activity in Albania and, though not in very high numbers, it is a criminal form that has assumed organised features. In the cases adjudicated by the First Instance of Serious Crimes Court during the time period 2008-2012, about 18% of the judgements had to do with extortion.

While the prevalence of extortion for businesses in Albania amounts only 0.5%, the data from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report on Business, Corruption and Crime in Albania shows extortion is a cause for concern. Extortion is a very serious crime in which the perpetrators try to obtain money or other benefits from a company by threatening or intimidating managers or employees. In some cases, extortion is also presented as the offer of “protection” from damages to property or persons. Sometimes extortion can be linked to organised crime groups, who have the power and the means to make a credible threat towards a business with potentially dire consequences if their demands are not met.

On the Research Report of Gender and Corruption in the Albanian Civil Service, among the corrupt practices scoring highest under the “not prevalent” response appear to be extortion. Women more often than men see extortion (including sexual extortion) as not prevalent (22.9% of the women as compared to 16.7% of the men) or little prevalent (33.3% of the women as compared to 31.3% of the men). Likewise, more men than women believe that extortion is highly prevalent in the Albanian Civil Service (6.3% men vs. 4.2% women).

The 2020 Crime & Safety Report on Albania published by OSAC (Overseas Security Advisory Council) states that the Albanian government is making a concerted effort to improve the country’s law enforcement capabilities and reduce corruption. Organized crime has a noted impact on Albania, with a network of criminal organisations involved in drug trafficking, extortion, bribery etc.

The government’s efforts towards the fight against corruption and increased public trust are to some extent “reflected” in the statistics on applications to initiate criminal proceedings on the fact of extortion.

Thus, according to the Summary information on the statistics on offences committed in 2018, published by the Police of the Republic of Armenia, in 2018 only 67 citizens applied to the law-enforcement bodies with a statement on the initiation of a criminal case on the fact of extortion. In this respect, 55 criminal cases were initiated, and in 11 cases law-enforcement bodies refused to initiate a criminal case on the fact to the absence of the body of crime.

In 2019, 92 citizens applied to the law-enforcement bodies with a statement on the initiation of a criminal case on the fact of extortion. 78 criminal cases were initiated, and in 12 cases the law-enforcement bodies refused to initiate a criminal case on the fact to the absence of the body of crime.

In 2020, the number of applications on initiation of criminal cases on the fact of extortion increased to 173. In this respect, 148 criminal cases were initiated, and only in 18 cases law-enforcement bodies found an absence of the body of crime.

The Global Corruption Barometer for 2013 showed that “28% of respondents stated that they gave bribes in connection with the provision of some public services, with health and the police leading the way. Most of these respondents – 41% – said they gave bribes to speed up the process of getting services, 30% gave bribes as a token of gratitude or as a gift, 18% because they could not otherwise get a service, and 11% to get a cheaper service.“

According to a 2015 Transparency International BiH survey, a quarter of citizens said they had the opportunity to be bribed. The research results showed that "the professions that come in the most contact with bribery are doctors, politicians and police officers". More than 800 citizens contacted the free hotline 0800 55555 operated by Transparency International BIH, seeking legal advice. The largest number of reported cases, as in previous years, related to the public administration sector - citizens mainly reported corrupt employment practices.

In the Monitoring Survey on the National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Strategy Impact conducted in 2019 by UNDP, participants were asked to answer the question whether, during the last 12 months, they encountered any corruption cases coming from public agents. The share of answers provided by the population and businesses that have encountered any of the mentioned cases does not exceed 6% in the study. Extortion of funds (obtaining money by force) was indicated by 2% of the respondents among the general population and by 1% among businesses. It can be observed that there have been few cases, and in comparison with the previous study, there has been a decrease in the share of affirmative answers for all the answer options (Misappropriation and fraud, Use of working time for personal purposes, Requesting favours of any form, Favouritism, bribe, abuse of power, traffic of influence).

According to the National Anti-Corruption Centre, in 2018, there were a total of 700 corruption acts, of which 42 involved mayors, and the most affected communities were Chişinău, Bălţi, UTA Găgăuzia, Cahul, Criuleni, and Soroca.

In 2017, 26% of those who reported giving a bribe did so due to direct extortion. Another 27% were indirectly asked for a bribe. 25.7% reported giving a bribe in order to persuade public officials to fulfil their duty.

On 20 May 2019, the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre presented the results of the study “Statistical analysis of court decisions in criminal cases related to corruption”, which analysed 36 410 court decisions in criminal cases issued during 2014-2018. According to the key findings of the study, the share of crimes related to obtaining illicit gain (inter alia, through extortion) is paramount, which shows the scale of the problem in Ukraine.

The study shows that the most common punishment for corruption crimes is a fine – almost 51% of court cases. At the same time, only 10% of court decisions end up with imprisonment.

Based on Article 109/b of the Criminal Code, “Forcing through blackmail or violence for submission of the wealth (Extortion)”, is defined as «Causing a person, through blackmail or violence, to do or not do a certain action, in order to unjustly gain wealth or any other benefit, for themselves or for third persons, is sentenced with imprisonment from two to eight years.

The same act, when committed by using or by threatening to use a gun, torture, inhuman and humiliating acts which have caused harm to the health, are sentenced by imprisonment of from seven to fifteen years.

When the crime has caused the death of the person, it is sentenced by life imprisonment».

The Criminal Code of Armenia (Article 182) defines extortion as a threat to publicize defamatory information or information inflicting significant damage to the person’s or his relatives’ rights or legal interests, the threat to use violence against the person or his relatives, or to destroy (damage) the property owned or managed by the person, his relatives or other persons, with a demand to surrender the property rights, or other actions involving property. Extortion is punished with a fine of 400-800 times the minimum salary, or with arrest for up to 3 months, or with imprisonment for a term of up to 4 years. If aggravating circumstances have been revealed, extortion shall be punished with imprisonment for the term of up to 10 years.

Article 311 of Armenian Criminal Code (Bribery), part 3 establishes criminal liability of receipt of a bribe, committed by extortion, which is punished by imprisonment for a term of 4-10 years, with or without confiscation of property. Article 200 of Armenian Criminal Code (Commercial Bribery), part 4 establishes criminal liability of receipt of a commercial bribe, committed by extortion, which is punished by a fine of 300-500 times the minimum salaries, or deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term of up to 5 years, or by imprisonment for a term of up to of 5 years.

Besides the above-mentioned types of extortion, the Criminal Code of Armenia establishes liability for commitment of other specific types of extortion, such as:

• Article 234. Theft or extortion of radioactive materials;
• Article 238. Theft or extortion of weapons, ammunition, explosives or explosive devices;
• Article 269. Theft or extortion of drugs or psychotropic substances;
• Article 311.1, part 3. Receiving illegal remuneration through extortion by a public servant or by a person holding public position;
• Article 311.2, part 3. Using real or perceived influence through extortion (Trading in influence).

Extortion is a criminal offence according to the entity criminal laws and the Criminal Code of the Brčko District of BiH in such a way that someone who, in order to obtain illegal property gain by force or severe threat, forces another to do or not do harm to his or someone else's property, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term between three months and five years, and one and five years respectively.

The following articles from the Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova set the legal framework in this field:

• Article 324 (1) on Passive corruption; 
• Article 325 (1) on Active Corruption;
• Article 326 (1) on Influence peddling;
• Article 327 (1) on Abuse of power or official misconduct, and;
• Article 328 (1) on Excessive power or exceeding work attributions.

The Criminal Code (Article 354, note 5) defines extortion as a «demand to provide unjustified benefit with a threat to take actions or omit to act using one's position, authority granted, power, or service position in relation to the person who provides unjustified benefit, or deliberate creation of conditions under which a person is compelled to provide unjustified benefit in order to prevent harmful consequences for his/her rights and legitimate interests». In line with Article 368, paragraph 3 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, extortion of unjustified benefits can be punished by imprisonment between five to ten years and deprivation of the right to hold certain offices or engage in certain activities for three years, and confiscation of private property.

Concerns over accountability, transparency, and the capacity of local governing bodies to deliver quality services remain a pressing matter in Albania. Clientelism is a phenomenon widespread throughout the Western Balkans, but it manifests itself in various forms and ways, which are difficult to identify and scientifically verify.

Besides employment, the inclusion of families within the social aid scheme in the months prior to elections is a form of clientelism, especially important for low-income families. Cases of decision-making by local institutions which increased the number of persons receiving social aid during the pre-election period in 2017 indicate the persistence of this form of political clientelism.

Albanian legislation on parties is restrictive for regional, local, and religious parties, and prohibits ethnic parties. However, if the lobbying phenomenon continues to develop as it is expected, the relevant legislation and the current parties’ profile will need to be reviewed. As long as the state continues to be the biggest employer, clientelist methods will continue to damage the quality of administration and other public sectors. Simultaneously, the negative effect is twofold: those who benefit are identified with the party in power, those who lose are identified with the competitive alternative of the current party in government and expected to repeat in case of victory of their team, the same selective and clientelist process.

Clientelism occurs pretty widely in Armenia as the officials are often abusing their positions to exert influence on their subordinates to receive services that benefit their private interests. This may also take place in the private organisations, where the employees are dependent. This phenomenon is largely driven by the poor conditions of the labor market, whereas many people appear to be vulnerable to external pressures and eager to maintain or get jobs.

Clientelism may particularly take place during the elections in a form of vote buying, contribution to specific political party’s campaign, etc. Patronal voting - a distinct form of clientelism – has been rather widespread a few years ago.

In 2017, a study on the political behavior of the Armenian voters showed that the major part of electorate sided with the ruling Republican Party of Armenia and a tycoon-sponsored Prosperous Armenia Party on the basis of “a familial or relational proximity with the party, which then helps them further their economic mobility.” Hence, this creates patronal networks around these parties.”

The snap parliamentary elections held in December 2018 - merely 1.5 years after April 2017 elections - provided completely different results, as the Republican Party of Armenia, strongly ruling since 2007, did not even pass the threshold to get the seats in the parliament.

Though some signs of patronal voting still exist, this phenomenon has been considerably declined since the revolution of 2018.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is often called a "captive" state, in which systemic corruption controls all spheres of state organisation, political and social life. Thus, clientelism, as one of the manifestations of corruption, is very present in Bosnia and Herzegovina. "The main actors of political clientelism are people from the top of political parties, the business world and individuals who at the same time occupy political functions and positions in public companies or private companies.“ Clientelism involves the exchange of resources, such as money, positions, employment, laws and regulations, information, and other non-financial resources, to satisfy private interests.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a "dominant clientelist society ... without belonging to a political party it is not possible to get a job, do business successfully, and often access to justice itself depends on belonging to a political party"."Completely subordinated to the cartel's interests in remaining in power and gaining personal gain, the public sector as such rests on clientelism and cronyism, through which fully effective control over it is ensured."

In the overall ranking of an index measuring the level of clientelism in the media in southeast Europe, Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the lowest position with Romania with an index score of -0.67.

Clientelist ties in the Republic of Moldova are most often based on party affiliations. A regional report from 2018 on party organisation and clientelism in transition countries, indicates that parties in the Republic of Moldova appear to be the more clientelism-oriented among the three investigated countries (Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine). The Republic of Moldova’s Democratic Party is the most clientelist party out of the 15 investigated in the study. Additionally, in the Republic of Moldova, the territorial coverage of the parties is the main driver for clientelism. The same study indicates that if public funding is a source for clientelism, there should be mechanisms to control the amount of financial resources allocated to parties and how political parties spend them. Like Georgia and Ukraine, which were also investigated in the above-mentioned study, the Republic of Moldova lacks the scrutiny of public funding to parties, and this may be one reason for which clientelism keeps flourishing.

Today, clientelism is still a risk in the following situations:

• The mixed electoral system voted by the parliament on 20 July 2017. The new voting system provides for 50 deputies to be elected on proportional party lists, while another 51 will be elected in uninominal constituencies (only the candidate who wins the greatest number of votes in an uninominal constituency will make it to Parliament). Political analysts and civil society have long argued that uninominal voting would encourage clientelism, nepotism, and the allocation of local resources based on clientelism.
• Political loyalty/clientelism determines the selection of civil servants at the higher levels of government.
• The political affiliation and party migration of local elected officials in order to increase the chances of the respective municipality receiving more funding from national investment funds. The new Law on Local Public Finances, implemented in 2015, has considerably reduced the political criteria in the distribution of investment funds from national level to municipal level. Before 2015, Members of the Parliament usually proposed amendments to the annual state budget law so that localities that are politically-friendly to the incumbents get more public resources and the opposition less. Another strong reason for clientelism and the political migration of mayors is to avoid the selective pressure of representatives from opposition parties; criminal investigations have started many times without solid evidence. The ratio of mayors from opposition parties against which criminal investigations have been initiated, compared with the ones from the ruling parties, is instructive.

According to Article 328 of the Criminal Code “Active Corruption in Elections” provides that “offering or giving money, material goods, the promise of a job or other favours in any form, to the voter or other related persons, in order to obtain the signature for the nomination of a candidate in the election, to vote in a certain way, to participate or not to vote, or to engage in illegal activities in support of a candidate or political party, constitutes a criminal offense and is punishable by imprisonment of one to five years.”

The Law on Public Service bans public officials and servants from using their official position to provide actual benefits or privileges to political parties, public organisations, including religious groups. Article 311-2 of the Criminal Code of Armenia bans the use of real or alleged influence for personal or group interests. Such kind of actions is punished with fines of 200-400 times the minimum salary, or with imprisonment for a maximum term of 10 years, with or without confiscation of property.

Generally, there exist many loopholes and there are not concrete enforcement mechanisms to provide guarantees against clientelism.

All the regulations cited in this Handbook (civil service laws, election law, laws on prevention of conflict of interest, political party financing laws, codes of ethics) contain – although not explicitly – provisions that should prevent the emergence and spread of clientelism. However, the regulations are only formally enforced. This is most evident in the sphere of employment in the public sector. "Responsible jobs are given to politically eligible people, vacancies in the public sector are just a farce, and getting a job is agreed within parties and outside institutions – most often in pubs."

One of the most significant examples of clientelism in the Republic of Moldova is related to the allocation procedures for public resources from national investment funds to first-level local governments. Public resources are used as a ‘lure’ to ensure independent candidates’ loyalty toward the political majority.

There were cases where mayors from other political parties were ‘forced’ to join the ruling party, having been promised the chance to benefit from capital investments. Currently, there are efforts in place to address the above issues through Law No. 68 of 5 April 2012, on the Approval of the National Decentralisation Strategy, and the Action Plan on the Implementation of the National Decentralisation Strategy for the years 2012-2018.

Given that clientelism is seen as a dominant trend when it comes to the allocation of funds to local authorities – particularly capital investments – it is important that the following core principles outlined in the World Bank’s guidebook to capital investments for local governments are being referred to by local authorities in negotiations with national authorities and in drafting their local budgets:

• Local government does not spend its limited resources on ‘frivolous’ investment in projects that should not be government business (for example, speculative commercial real estate);
• All needs are compared objectively;
• Prudent long-term fiscal policy is exercised;
• Innovative solutions at project level are considered;
• Individuals have effective channels through which to express their preferences.

The most common corrupt practices in Albania that seem to contribute to the high levels of perceived corruption include favouritism, such as nepotism and patronage.

During electoral periods, patronage networks employ vote-buying/selling as a method to collect votes in exchange for different forms of favours/support.

In order to decrease the levels of patronage in Albania, several changes were made to the Electoral Code related to employment during election campaign. Considering the electoral campaign of the parliamentary elections of April 2021, not much progress has been made. 

Alongside nepotism, patronage is one of the most common forms of conflict of interest in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nepotism, clientelism and patronage as "a special phenomenon where a person is selected for employment or promoted to a better-paid job due to suitable political affiliation or political ties" form an unbreakable link in the corrupt chain of employment practices in the public sector in BiH. This is particularly pronounced at the level of local communities. It often happens that “office-holders, as well as officials who perform tasks in local communities, are related by family, friends and business. In such circumstances, the private interests of individuals and groups often prevail over the public interest and lead to nepotism, cronyism, and conflicts of interest, which due to inadequate mechanisms to prevent them inevitably open the door to the development of corruption. This is especially present in the field of labour relations in local self-government units where, due to deficiencies in regulations governing this area and inadequate mechanisms for preventing conflicts of interest, there are numerous abuses, both in the recruitment process and promotion and status of officials. which causes the emergence of nepotism and trade in political and other influences.“

Reporters wrote on anticoruptie.md that 2018 was marked by several controversial appointments and promotions to senior positions in certain major state institutions of the country. Some of them raised questions about the criteria for promotion. Experts qualified these appointments as political decisions, and explained that the government had merely rotated some people from one job to another.

The Survey on Anti-Corruption Strategy Impact Monitoring from 2019 measured public agents’ perceptions with regards to measures needed to be taken to eliminate favouritism situations in the public sector. Of those surveyed, 62% (69% in 2017) thought that the superior hierarchical leader should be announced, 37% (41% in 2017) considered that cases of favouritism should be reported to the National Anti-Corruption Centre, and 32% in both surveys advocate for denunciation at the National Integrity Authority. Survey results show that most public agents declare that the requirements of the institutional integrity are respected in the institutions they work in.

Among the main causes of non-declaration of conflicts of interest by public agents are the lack of knowledge of the procedure (47% in 2019, 54% in 2017) and the gain of personal benefits (financial, material or other) (33% in 2019, 42% in 2017).

The results of the survey indicate that public agents have a high level of knowledge regarding legal/illegal situations in the regime of conflict of interests and the non-admission of favouritism: about 87% (77% in 2017) of public agents offered correct answers to all possible situations of corruption concerning the regime of conflict of interests and non-admission of favouritism.

Patronage is considered to be widespread and poorly regulated in Ukrainian politics. The situation, when a politician provides an executive position to a person based on a personal relationship rather than merit, creates a vicious circle of favouritism. The favour of giving the job creates pressure to return the favour and blurs the boundary between political office and executive positions. In other words, due to patronage, bureaucracy loses its impartiality but remains difficult to prove at the same time.

The Electoral Code of Albania in Article 3, under “General Principles”, paragraph 7, provides: “Except as otherwise provided by law, it shall be prohibited to provide electoral subjects with the opportunity to use equipment, funds and materials that are public property, as well as with other individuals who are working in the public administration of any level”.

The Electoral Code of Albania also includes regulations such as: “During the election campaign, employment, dismissal from work and job transfers, in public entities or public institutions are prohibited, except in justified cases.

Also, it is prohibited for the employees of the state administration that during the working hours and within the premises of the state institutions, to participate in activities of a political nature, or that benefit a political party or candidate in the election campaign. An employee of the state administration is prohibited from using public goods, state function or activity or public financial, material, human resources, in order to favour a political party, coalition or candidate in elections.

The employee of the state administration has the right to participate in the political or electoral activities of an electoral subject or candidate, only after the official working hours and outside the premises of the state institutions.

The laws on civil service at all levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina contain provisions on the manner of employment in administrative bodies and positions and activities incompatible with the duties of civil servants. In addition, codes of ethics include provisions on the prevention of conflicts of interest and the prevention of abuse of office, which apply not only to civil servants but also to all employees in administrative bodies.

However, incoherent internal systems and the internal inconsistency of regulations in some cases openly legalize corruption and its manifestations. Thus, for example, according to the Law on Civil Service of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which also applies to the local level of government in the Federation of BiH, a civil servant is appointed by the head of the civil service institution, after having obtained the opinion of the FBiH Civil Service Agency, “from the list of successful candidates who passed the public competition".  Such a provision opens space for unlimited arbitrariness of the heads of administrative bodies – who are politically appointed persons – to bring and employ persons close and suitable to them into the bodies and institutions headed by them in order to reward those who brought their party votes in the elections. Even in cases where the head of the administrative body is prescribed to nominate the first from the list of successful candidates after the competition procedure, the law is formally met, and practice shows that in public competitions “mostly the best advisers are elected officials, party activists and family members of politicians and senior civil servants".

Nepotism, clientelism and patronage are especially pronounced in employment in companies, institutions and organisations with public authority because the laws on public enterprises and regulations on institutions and organisations with public authority do not contain the institute of public competition in employment of workers.

The Law on Integrity No. 82/2017 provides a definition for favouritism, which consists of the “support provided by the public agent whilst exercising his function to the natural persons or legal entities when solving their problems, regardless of the motives, which is not provided for by normative acts and does not meet the elements of a conflict of interests or the elements of an offence”.

Article 15 on Avoidance of favouritism stipulates the following:

1. For the purpose of serving public interest with impartiality and objectivity, favouritism practices in public entities are inadmissible.

2. A public agent is obliged to reject favouritism in his/her professional activity;

3. The head of the public entity is obliged:

• to not knowingly admit favouritism practices in the professional activity of the public agents from the entity he/she leads;
• to report cases of favouritism to the National Anti-Corruption Centre.

The Law No. 889 “On Civil Service” of 10 December 2015 obliges civil servants to be politically impartial. Article 10 of the Law states that civil servants must implement legal directives independently of their own political views or the political affiliation of the authority. Besides, civil servants of the highest category are not allowed to be members of a political party or to be members of the local council. It is prohibited for all civil servants to be involved in political campaigns or in events organised by political parties, or to use public office for any political purposes. Article 10.3 of the abovementioned law explicitly prohibits the use of administrative resources and reduces corruption risks related to patronage.